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Do heavily-unionized companies compensate their 
CEOs less in periods of financial distress? Evidence 
from Canadian companies during the financial crisis. 
 
Muhammad Umar Boodoo 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the strategic interaction between employee stakeholders, in particular labor unions, 
and top management, and evaluates the effect of the two parties’ inherent competitive rent-seeking 
behavior on CEO pay. Using a panel of firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index, this paper finds 
that CEO compensation withstood the financial crisis despite lower and even negative corporate 
performance. Further, heavily-unionized companies were associated with higher CEO pay in terms of 
non-equity elements such as salary and pension allocations. The presence of unions had no observed 
effect in reducing bonuses, stock options, and restricted stock units. These findings have implications 
for the debate on income inequality, and the power of unions to bring about change. 
 
Keywords: Executive labor market, Economic inequality, Executive pay, Labor union, Great 
Recession. 
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In publicly-listed companies where ownership is dispersed, there is an agency conflict where 
managerial prerogatives may not be perfectly aligned with shareholder interests. To monitor and 
manage this conflict, the task of hiring and incentivizing managers and other executives is 
delegated to an elected Board of Directors, acting on behalf of the shareholders. Such delegation 
and its impacts on firm performance and executive compensation packages have been studied by 
scholars from various fields of research and practice. While some research (e.g., Rosen (1990); 
Hubbard (2005); Gabaix and Landier (2008)) draw closer to labor market efficiency that rewards 
executives for their differential human capital, others (e.g., Jensen (1993); Hall and Murphy 
(2003); Bebchuk and Fried (2006)) argue that such delegation to the Board leads to excessive 
executive compensation. 
If labor markets are inefficient in terms of allocating and rewarding managers, in particular 
CEOs who are typically the highest paid and most visible executives, this then begs the following 
questions: How crucial is board effectiveness in terms of setting up ‘fair’ compensation 
packages? How do other stakeholders such as the media, the public, and employees react to and 
influence board decisions? Can labor unions, which generally compress pay (Freeman and 
Medoff (1984)), exert significant political pressure on the compensation committee of the board 
of Directors to curb ‘excessive’ CEO pay? 
While the relationship between corporate governance and CEO pay has been studied in 
various economic and financial contexts (e.g. Useem (1984); Zajac and Westphal (1994); Davis 
(2003); Hermalin (2005); Finkelstein et al. (2009)), there is an interesting literature re-emerging 
on the influence of labor unions on corporate decisions and corporate performance. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) posit that unions can implicitly affect CEO compensation because public 
disclosure of such compensation practices would reduce the information asymmetry that unions 
and workers have with regards to company health and future projections. Higher CEO pay would 
give unions greater power in bargaining and collective agreement negotiations. There is evidence 
that unions care about ‘excessive’ CEO compensation. The largest American-based union 
federation, the AFL-CIO for example, frequently writes to its members and to the press about 
high CEO pay and rising income inequality. The issue could not be more timely given the effects 
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of the financial meltdown since 2007. There is some prior research that has looked at the effect of 
unions on executive pay. Gomez and Tzioumis (2006); Ertimur et al. (2011) find that unions do 
succeed in curbing CEO pay but the studies, while theoretically sound, are again largely US-
focused and cannot precisely identify how the strength and not just the presence of unions affects 
CEO pay. 
I attempt to fill in the aforementioned gaps by analyzing governance mechanisms, union 
pressure and their relationship to the compensation of CEOs of firms listed on the S&P/TSX 
composite index from 2008 to 2011.  This paper belongs to the stream of studies that have looked 
into the non-economic determinants of CEO compensation (e.g. Yermack (1996); Core et al. 
(1999); Bertrand and Mullainaithan (2001); DiNardo et al. (2000); Singh and Agarwal (2002). 
By and large, most studies have focused on board structures and very few papers have looked 
into the impact of indirect political constraints exercised by the media as well as employees, who 
are major company stakeholders. One can surmise that the primary reason for this paucity of 
studies is that measuring employee interest in CEO compensation is empirically difficult. Also, 
big corporations in the United States have very few strong unions which can exert pressure on 
compensation committees. This paper, turning to Canada (a country with a relatively high union 
density vis-a-vis the US) during the years of the financial crisis, considers the governance 
structures of corporations listed on the S&P/TSX composite index and also includes this 
employee dimension by considering the extent of unionization across companies. 
Governance and CEO Compensation 
Analysis of the compensation committee, the board of directors and general governance 
structures have given rise to a number of papers, mostly in Finance journals, establishing the link 
between several governance attributes and CEO compensation. Governance attributes include, 
but are not limited to, independence of board members, relation of such members with company 
affiliates, committee independence, CEO/Chair split and Board/Director Evaluation. The 
relationship between such attributes and CEO compensation is mixed in the literature. Jensen 
(1993) argues that compensation decisions should be delegated to outside directors because they 
are better able to make rational and unbiased judgments about these situations. However, the 
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same paper also notes that outside and so-called independent directors tend to be nominated by 
the CEO and as such may have a duty of obligation towards the latter. In such cases, the 
unbiasedness may be called into question. Indeed, Main et al. (1995) suggests that CEOs 
“manage” their compensation committees to extract higher pay for a given level of performance. 
This can be done through board interlocks, and other formal professional networks. In the same 
light, Hermalin (2005) argues that the surge in CEO pay is due to tighter corporate governance: 
to compensate for the extra scrutiny from the board members, CEOs get compensated with 
higher pay. Newman and Mozes (1999) do not find evidence that levels of CEO compensation is 
greater in companies that have “insiders” on the compensation committee. The authors, however, 
do find evidence that the relationship between CEO pay and performance is more favorable 
toward the CEO, at the expense of shareholders, when there are “insiders” on the compensation 
committee. 
Most papers, however, report a negative correlation between the strength and independence of 
governance structures and CEO compensation. Core et al. (1999), for example, use governance 
and compensation data for publicly-traded US companies and find that CEOs earn greater 
compensation when governance structures are weak, which exacerbates the agency problem. 
CEOs tend to be compensated at a higher level if they also chair the board of directors, if the 
board size is bigger and if the board is composed of a number of outside directors who have been 
appointed by the CEO. Given such governance problems and corporate scandals, the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission embarked upon a series of requirement alterations 
much in line with the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Using these regulatory changes as a 
quasi-experiment, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) use a difference-in-difference approach 
and report that firms that were most affected by Board provisions emanating from the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act drastically reduced their levels of CEO Compensation, i.e. those companies, which 
had to improve their governance structures to comply with the new rules, significantly reduced 
the level of pay of their CEOs. Even though some scholars argue that CEOs may be compensated 
at a higher rate because of stricter governance mechanisms, most papers in this area of the 
literature have reported that stronger governance is associated with lower “excessive” pay. 
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Employees/Unions acting as implicit regulators of CEO pay 
Employees represent a powerful stakeholder group who may heavily influence the HR 
department as well as the compensation committee on the board of directors. In the labor 
relations literature (e.g. Freeman and Medoff (1984)), it is accepted that if employees are 
represented by unions, they tend to act as a politically powerful counterbalance to managerial 
power. In their seminal paper, Jensen and Murphy (1990) set out how unions may impact 
workplace-level policies and, by extension, apply considerable pressure on the corporate 
headquarters’ executives and directors. Unions position themselves as fairness activists and if 
they perceive that executives are being overpaid potentially at the expense of employee benefits, 
they can demonstrate their show of strength mainly through threats to disrupt the activities at the 
workplace. Such union pressure can be formally exercised during collective bargaining 
negotiations through public awareness campaigns via blogs, social networking websites, political 
maneuvering and public policy research. For example, Ertimur et al. (2011) find that union 
pension funds can use shareholder proposals and vote-no campaigns to constrain executive pay. 
At the negotiating table, unions may also be able to anchor higher (make fewer concessions 
and bargain more strongly) if they have clear evidence that the earnings of executives and the 
CEO, in particular, have been going up during the period covering the previous collective 
bargaining agreement (Jensen and Murphy (1990)).1 DiNardo et al. (2000) use a sample of 
publicly-traded US companies between 1971 and 1982 and initially report that union strength, 
measured in terms of union density at the firm level, is negatively correlated with CEO 
compensation, i.e. the stronger the union, the lower is the level of CEO compensation. However, 
after controlling for industry and firm fixed effects, their results become insignificant and even 
suggest a positive relationship between union strength and CEO compensation. The latter is more 
akin to the hypothesis in Hermalin (2005) where one would think that CEOs have to be 
                                                     
1 The AFL-CIO website, for example, has a database dedicated to CEO compensation. Workers and unions can verify 
the compensation of their CEOs. See http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-the-99 
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compensated for the extra pressure of having to deal with stronger unions. Singh and Agarwal 
(2002), in a contextually different paper, looks at 86 Canadian mining and manufacturing firms 
listed on the TSX in 1996. After controlling for firm size and performance, the authors find that 
union presence is positively correlated with CEO base salary, but uncorrelated with the other 
components of CEO pay. These findings give impetus to the “ratchet” effect whereby unionized 
firms, which are generally associated with higher wages than non-unionized ones, drive up the 
labor costs starting from the workers and going all the way through to the executives. 
One of the papers that is closest to this study is Gomez and Tzioumis (2006), which extends 
the previous literature on unionization and CEO compensation by using a panel of publicly-listed 
US companies between 1992 and 2001. The authors match the compensation data with the data 
on workplace unionization from the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) and conclude that union 
presence is significantly negatively correlated with stock option values and hence total CEO 
compensation. Although there is a positive relationship between CEO base salary and union 
presence, this effect is small and is, in fact, wiped out, after accounting for stock options. 
Unions and other corporate policies 
Unions, and management in particular, often restrain disseminating information about the 
(financial) state of the company in order to advance their own interests, sometimes at the expense 
of the firm. For example, Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993); Perotti and Spier (1993) theoretically 
show that firms reduce cash flows available to unions by issuing more debt. Bronars and Deere 
(1991); Hanka (1998); Matsa (2010); Myers and Saretto (2011) find evidence to support this 
theory. On the other hand, unions are known to assert their collective power to reduce the cash 
flow of their employers. For example, Hirsch (1992) finds that unionized firms invest less in 
R&D while Bradley et al. (2015) find that unionized companies innovate less. As a result, it is 
sometimes posited in the literature that unionized companies have relatively lower profitability 
and shareholder value (Ruback and Zimmerman (1984); Abowd (1989); Hirsch (1991); Lee and 
Mas (2012)). 
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Hypothesis Development 
This paper attempts to combine governance and unionization in order to capture the effects of 
both mechanisms on CEO compensation. While not establishing a causal relationship, this paper 
looks at firms in the post-financial scandal period and their CEO compensation practices during a 
recessionary period to track down how differences in governance practices and unionization were 
associated with differences in CEO compensation across firms. Given that Board of Directors are 
elected to be representatives of shareholders, one would hypothesize that they will monitor CEO 
performance and CEO pay and align managerial actions with shareholder interests. These 
interests are essentially geared towards increasing firm value. As such, a generic first set of 
hypotheses (more prominent with Accounting and Finance scholars) which are in line with 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Core et al. (1999) but contrary to Hermalin (2005) will be: 
Hypothesis 1. Companies with stronger governance structures in terms of CEO/Chair split, 
and independence of the audit and compensation committees reward their CEOs less than 
companies with poorer governance 
As for unions, there are two basic channels, one direct and the other indirect, by which unions 
are linked to executive compensation. The direct channel is based on the pressure that unions can 
bring to bear within the firm and its various establishments. This pressure, as noted by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) is traditionally exercised through the voicing of fairness and equity concerns and 
the threat of industrial disruption at the workplace, either of which would be expected to occur if 
union members perceive executive compensation as excessive. In this context, union pressure is 
observed during formal collective bargaining negotiations, but it can also be channeled 
informally through local stewards, public awareness campaigns and even through the sponsorship 
of journalism and public policy research critical of alleged managerial excesses (Katz et al. 
(2003)).  This direct channel would imply that unions would tend to reduce CEO compensation.  
However, the relationship between unions and CEO pay can be more complex within this direct 
channel of influence.  A breakdown of the different elements of CEO compensation is needed to 
comprehend how this direct channel may operate.   
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Research that has emanated from the seminal work of Freeman and Medoff (1984) would 
identify a couple of ways in which unions may directly affect CEO pay.  On the one hand, as 
Singh (2002) identified, there could be a ratchet effect in terms of the fixed components of CEO 
pay (salary and pension).  The union wage premium that exists in heavily-unionized firms as 
opposed to weakly-unionized firms would raise salaries and pensions of all employee ranks up to 
and including the CEO.  This ratchet effect, or something akin to a compensation differential 
where the CEO is paid a higher fixed income because he/she is expected to deal with several 
unions and several bargaining rounds, would be in line with theories about what unions do to 
CEO pay.  As such, the first hypothesis linking unionization to CEO pay would be:  
Hypothesis 2a. Companies which have higher levels of union density pay their CEOs higher 
fixed incomes in terms of salaries and pension benefits 
On the other hand, however, a further direct effect put forward by Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
posits that unions perceive high executive pay as a signal for the firm’s financial health.  They 
employ this as a justification for increased wage demands during negotiations. As such, to 
counter such possibilities, compensation committees and senior Board members would be more 
cautious when negotiating CEO pay. Unions, much like the public oversight faced by executives 
of firms operating within regulated industries, are predicted by Jensen and Murphy to truncate 
executive remuneration and make it less sensitive to firm performance.  This would imply that 
bonuses, which are tied to company performance, and stock options and restricted stock units, 
which are tied to market valuation and long-term growth potential, would be lower for CEOs 
who work in heavily-unionized companies.   
Hypothesis 2b. Companies which have higher levels of union density pay their CEOs lower 
variable incomes in terms of bonuses, options, and restricted stock units 
Overall the relationship between unionization and CEO pay is, therefore, indeterminate.  It 
depends on which of the fixed or variable components of pay dominate the other.  In the current 
period that is studied, a recession would tend to keep the fixed components stable while the 
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variable components would suffer.  With the theoretical underpinning that unionized employees’ 
preference for fixed over variable pay (Freeman and Medoff (1984)) can ratchet up to the upper 
echelons of management, the recessionary phase which affected companies during the years 
2008 till 2010 would itself affect the variations in CEO pay across heavily-unionized and lesser-
unionized companies.   
Hypothesis 2c. CEOs of heavily-unionized firms would earn higher total compensation 
during the financial crisis when variable components of pay decline substantially relative to 
the fixed components of pay 
The second channel by which unions and executive compensation could be linked is indirect 
and relates to the adverse consequences that union presence can have on profitability and share 
price fluctuations, which in turn, determines bonuses and the stock-related value of executive 
compensation. By and large, it appears that financial market antipathy toward unions stems not 
so much from adverse productivity effects (Kuhn (1985, 1988)) or lower R&D spending, but 
rather from the expectation that union influence over a firm’s governance leads to inflexibility 
and greater redistribution of rents toward workers. Heavily-unionized firms (or even firms that 
have been the targets of organizing drives) are perceived as having to devote considerable 
resources to dealing with unions, or in trying to counteract their spread within the organization. 
Through this higher rent-seeking behavior of unions at the expense of shareholders, unions will 
act as a wedge between profitability and CEO pay, whereby unions seeking a more equal 
redistribution of profits will reduce the residual profits available to shareholders. As such, 
components of CEO pay such as bonuses, options and restricted stock units will be negatively 
affected. This is akin to conceptualizing unions as a moderating variable in the relationship 
between profitability and CEO pay. 
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between profitability and the bonus and equity 
components of CEO pay is smaller when union density is higher, and vice-versa 
Data, Variables, and Methodology 
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Data 
While boards and compensation committees can reward their CEOs in various forms, most 
compensation packages consist of a base salary, an annual bonus, stock options, restricted stock 
units, long-term incentive plans, other cash payments (severance etc.), and defined pension 
benefits or contributions. Data on governance and compensation were generously provided to me 
by the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness (CCBE). They collected 
data on CEO compensation for the firms listed on the S&P/TSX Composite in 2011 and have 
been tracking the compensation of those CEOs as far back as 2005. The advantage of tracking 
compensation this way is that my model and estimates will not be biased by firms entering and 
leaving the sample after a short period of time. In other words, the data consists of a subsample 
of firms on the S&P/TSX Composite which have been on the Index since 2005. The CCBE 
compensation data consists of salary, bonuses, pension allocations, options, restricted stock units, 
long-term incentive plans, and total compensation. Each component is evaluated at the beginning 
of the year when compensation contracts are set out and published in a mandatory corporate 
proxy circular. Typically, for a given company/CEO, the salary is fixed, the bonus is tied to 
accounting results and the CCBE follows most academic researchers and values stock options 
and restricted stock units using the Black-Scholes model. 
The CCBE has also been collecting and using their governance data to rate companies across 
Canada. Their estimates are very meticulously constructed and are in fact subject to further 
scrutiny from Corporate Directors and the national newspaper The Globe and Mail, which 
publishes the overall governance scores for each company in its yearly publication called Board 
Games. Their scoring is based on a proprietary weighting index of governance attributes such as 
number of independent Directors, independence of committees, and percentage of women on the 
Board. Essentially, for each attribute, each company in a given year is allotted a score of 100 and 
for each governance “miss” or bad performance from this benchmark, marks are deducted off 
this top score of 100. For example, if the audit committee has a member who is not independent, 
the company will score less than 100. 
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The union data was much more difficult to assemble, and these difficulties have been pointed 
out in previous research (e.g. DiNardo (2000) and Gomez (2006)).   In Canada (and the U.S.), 
unionization takes place at the plant or workplace level, whereas CEO pay is determined at the 
corporate level.  Linking these two is a methodological challenge.  Plants, workplaces and 
subsidiaries are not usually identified to the firm from databases that collect union agreements.  It 
belongs to the researcher to manually link each plant to a firm (in the relevant case).  Gomez 
(2006) did this, but it restricted the union variable to a dichotomous measure of union absence 
versus union presence.  Other research (e.g. Singh (2002)) restricted their study to one particular 
industry.  Given the breadth of this study and its use of union density rather than union presence, 
I did the following to fill in my unionization measure.  First, I used company-level unionization 
data from Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 database. The dataset starts from the year 2007 and data 
has been collected since then for Canadian companies.  Earlier data is sparse and cannot be relied 
upon.  Nonetheless, even in the year 2007 and onwards, there are a number of companies which 
have missing information. To combat the missing data problem, I hand-collected data and filled 
in only those companies which have zero union agreements, therefore zero density, between the 
years 2007-2010.  Collective bargaining is a provincial jurisdiction and this hand-collected part 
of the unionization data was put together from the Ontario Ministry of Labour. Ontario is 
Canada’s biggest province and this is perhaps why Canada is best suited for studies that match 
provincial-level workplace data to higher level corporate data. Most companies that are listed on 
the S&P/TSX Composite have their headquarters in Ontario and as such they would have a 
significant number of subsidiaries in Ontario. While restricting unionization to Ontario only is 
not the most appropriate methodology, it is a defensible position in that corporations would be 
most heavily scrutinized by their nearest monitors. Further, I only use this measure for non-
unionized companies when I ascertain that these companies have zero unions. I ascertain that 
some company-year observations have zero union density by checking the websites and proxy 
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circulars of those relevant companies.  Other than the value of zero, all union density measures at 
the company-year level are coming from Thomson Reuters ASSET42.   
The financial data (economic determinants of CEO pay) were put together by matching 
company ticker and names with records from DataStream. The S&P/TSX Composite had 204 
firms listed in 2011 and I initially follow all of them in their compensation packages back to 
2005. However, with certain income funds and companies not being evaluated by the CCBE in 
terms of governance, and with missing values with regards to unionization and other financial 
records emanating from DataStream, my final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 125 
firms over 4 years with a total of 430 observations. All nominal pay data are adjusted for 
inflation using CPI indices. The sample of firms is representative of the S&P/TSX Composite in 
that most firms are large ones from various industries. However, there is a slight dominance of 
firms in the financial services, and agricultural and mining industries. This is typical of the 
S&P/TSX Composite, which is why industry controls are important and are used in the analyses. 
Variables 
The compensation variables that will be used in this study have been covered in the previous 
section and consist of salary, bonus, pensions, options, restricted stock units, long-term incentive 
plans, and total compensation. The economic determinants of CEO compensation used in the 
literature (e.g. Core et al. (2008)) are size and some performance measures. I follow the previous 
literature and look to proxy firm size with different measures including sales, total assets and 
market capitalization. Such data is obtained from DataStream at the firm-year unit of analysis. 
Performance measures include return on assets (such returns are before interest and taxes) and 
return on equity. These measures are also obtained from DataStream. 
The governance attributes that will be used in this paper are: CEO/Chair split, audit and 
compensation committee independence.3 CEO/Chair split is an attempt to measure whether the 
                                                     
2 ASSET4 does have some accurate zero union-density information, but I further verify this with the aforementioned 
data collection procedure. 
3 I avoid using the Independence of Directors as a measure because of the fact that many of those independent 
directors may be handpicked by the CEO. However, results when independence is used as a governance attribute yield 
no different economic results to the ones reported in this paper. I also avoid using the CCBE overall score because it 
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Board can operate independently of the main actors/management of the company. A large 
deduction (-10) is made from the overall score of 100 if the CEO and Chair of the company are 
the same person. The CCBE deducts 7 points if there is a split between the CEO and the Chair 
but they are still related (usually because of some Board interlocks). A smaller deduction (-5) is 
made if the company has appointed an independent lead director to chair Board meetings. The 
best scenario in terms of governance structure is where a company has a fully independent lead 
director and a chair and a CEO who are not the same individual. In such a case, no point is 
deducted from the overall score of 100. 
The audit and compensation committee independence work in the same way. If a Board 
member sitting on either of these committees is related (through interlocks or through kinship) to 
a senior executive of the company, then the CCBE deducts 10 points off the overall score for this 
variable. These two committees are important because full-independence of a company’s audit 
and compensation committees is necessary to ensure that executive compensation and company 
accounting are handled without conflict of interest between management and shareholders. 
In terms of unionization at the firm-year level, I use a combination of ASSET4 and the 
Ontario Ministry of Labour data. The basic union density index is calculated by dividing the 
number of unionized employees by the total number of employees that are under contract from a 
particular company in a particular year. 
Table 1 shows the means of the CEO compensation components by year.4 Average (mean) 
total compensation fell by approximately 3.97% from 2008 to 2011 as the recession hit but from 
2010 to 2011 there was a slight increase as firms recovered and CEO pay followed suit. Most of 
the fall was explained by a fall in options granted (-18.3% from 2008 to 2011). Other than 
options falling and bonuses staying almost the same, there were increases in other components of 
CEO pay during the period in this study. For example, salary went up by 7.62%, and restricted 
stock units increased by 12.3%. Generally though, a fall of under 4% mostly agrees with 
                                                     
is not very intuitive to interpret given that I have no theoretical basis to justify the use of their proprietary weights in 
constructing these scores. 
4 There is an additional component of CEO compensation termed “other”. It is relatively insignificant (contains mostly 
zeros) and has been left out of this analysis. 
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Mackenzie (2011) that CEO pay withstood the recession: my data seems to suggest that salaries 
went up to counter the falling values of options, which are usually the biggest component of CEO 
pay. 
———————————— 
Insert TABLE 1 about here. 
———————————— 
This observation and the fact that returns to assets and equity (Table 2) fell post 2007 further 
leads support to the hypothesis put forth by Bebchuk and Fried (2006) in that pay does not 
necessarily vary with performance.5 However, as will be described in the next section on 
methodology, rather than use the absolute value of returns on assets as the measure of 
profitability that affects CEO compensation, I will use the difference between return on assets of 
firm i at time t minus the industry average return on assets at time t. Indeed, research such as 
Core et al. (2008) suggests that CEOs are paid according to their relative industry performance 
rather than absolute performance. In periods of financial distress such as in the period being 
studied, it is possible that a firm outperforms its competitors even though its profitability may 
have fallen. In such a case, it would not be uncommon to find a CEO be rewarded for above 
average performance (Core et al. (2008)). 
———————————— 
Insert TABLE 2 about here. 
———————————— 
                                                     
5 I am measuring the economic and non-economic determinants of pay from 2007 to 2010 given that compensation 
contracts are usually set out at the beginning of every year. So it seems plausible that the compensation contract set 
out for 2008 would be based on the firm performance in 2007 and in earlier years.  Summary statistics for measures 
of corporate governance are available upon request.   
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Methodology 
This paper attempts to explain variations in levels and rates of change in CEO pay emanating 
differences in governance structures and unionization. The following random-effects 
specification is run over an unbalanced panel of 125 firms in the years 2008 to 20116 
lnCit =α+βlnFirmSizei,t−1+γ(ROAi,t−1−IndustryAverageROAi,t−1)+∑ 𝛿3𝑗=1 CEO−ChairSplitij,t−1 
+ζAuditCommIndependencei,t−1+ηCompCommIndependencei,t−1 
+µUnionDensityi,t−1+νIndustryControls+εit (1) 
where Cit can represent either one of base salary, annual bonus, pension contribution, stock 
options, restricted stock units, long-term incentive plans or total compensation of the CEO of 
firm i at time t. All dependent variables have been transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
function. The standard in the literature is to use the log transform. This serves at least two 
purposes: 1) it smoothes the compensation measures given that, from Table 1, it was apparent 
that the dispersion between observations was rather high, and 2) it makes the interpretation easier 
in terms of elasticities. However, I cannot do the log transform for some of my variables such as 
bonus, options, RSU, and pension. Some firms in some years awarded their CEOs zero in some 
of these compensation elements. As such, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transform which is 
defined at zero, and which serves the same interpretation as a log transform. j denotes the 
categories of CEO-Chair Split that will be used as explanatory variables. 
Note that the explanatory variables have been lagged by 1 period given that the compensation 
variables is set at the beginning of time t. It is more likely that compensation contracts set at time 
t would look to the performance at time t −1 as an indicator of how much leverage the 
compensation committee has versus the CEO.7 
                                                     
6 I am running a panel random-effects regression because of time-varying heterogeneity across firms and because the 
research question seeks to compare across firms rather than within firms. Further, the changes within firm across 4 
years is small, especially along measures of union density. From a methodological point of view, a Hausman test 
revealed that random effects is more efficient than fixed effects (p > 0.05). 
7 Using 2-period and 3-period lags yield qualitatively similar results. 
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With regards to profitability 8 and CEO performance, one of the protocols in setting CEO 
compensation is that CEO performance is rated by comparing firm performance to average 
industry performance. In other words, a benchmarking view is used such that if a certain firm X 
performs better than its peers in the industry, then the CEO gets rewarded for this above-average 
performance, even if returns of firm X are negative. This is particularly important because during 
the financial crisis, many firms experienced negative profitability, but some firms outperformed 
their competitors. As such, one would expect that due to the benchmarking principle, their CEOs 
would earn a higher bonus or other form of payment such as options or RSU.9 
The size variable is a rather open-ended one in the literature. Different proxies have been used 
to measure firm size but I will pick market capitalization over sales and total assets since my 
sample (and the S&P/TSX Composite in general) is made up of firms that fall into different 2-
digit NAICS categories but a sizeable majority of such firms lie in mining, manufacturing and 
finance and insurance. Sales for mining firms are not the best proxy for size. An accounting 
measure such as total assets and/or market capitalization is more robust and captures size more 
effectively given the sample of firms in question.9 
Based on the previous literature reviewed by Murphy (1999) and based on my hypotheses 
developed in Section III, I expect that the sign of the β coefficient for firm size will be positive 
and around 0.35. I do not expect the γ coefficient (asset return minus industry average) to be 
significantly correlated with the salary component, but I do expect it to be positively related to 
the bonus, stock options and restricted stock units components and, hence, also to total 
compensation. In terms of the governance parameters, I expect the signs of each δ to be 
progressively negative, implying that the more split the CEO and the Chair, the less will be total 
compensation and its components. Similarly, if the audit and compensation committees are 
independent, then I expect CEO compensation to be lower. The union density measure is 
intriguing. Gomez and Tzioumis (2006) find that union presence leads to lower total 
                                                     
8 I avoid using stock return as a measure because it is highly correlated with asset return and most papers in this literature 
(see Core et al. (2008)) prefer asset return as a measure of profitability. 
9 Using absolute instead of benchmarked profitability yields similar results in terms of statistical significance. 
9I ran regressions where size is proxied through sales and total assets and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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compensation, in particular to lower bonuses and stock options for CEOs even though union 
presence is weakly associated with higher salaries for CEOs. Singh and Agarwal (2002), on the 
other hand, find that union density is positively correlated with CEO salary but uncorrelated with 
the other components of CEO pay. If unions are active and are politicizing fairness slogans, one 
could expect that they would negatively affect the equity components of CEO pay (which are the 
major share of total CEO compensation as depicted in Figure 1). 
Results and Discussion 
I first consider total compensation of CEOs as dependent variables.  Then, non-equity 
components are lumped together, and separately equity components are lumped together.  This is 
because unions, and studies about unions and their influence on CEO pay have tended to focus 
very largely on equity compensation of CEOs (e.g. Gomez and Tzioumis (2006)).  Therefore, 
this paper follows suit by considering these measures.  As indicated in the first row of Table 3, 
my measure of profitability: return on assets minus the industry average, yields no significant 
result when the dependent variable is total compensation or total non-equity compensation 
(salary+ bonus+pension). Interestingly, the observed effect of profitability on total equity 
compensation (options+restricted stock) is negative.   
———————————— 
Insert TABLE 3 about here. 
———————————— 
Overall, CEO pay seems to be unrelated to firm profitability. It is important to note here that the 
period 2008 to 2011 was a period where many of the firms on the S&P/TSX Composite Index 
suffered negative net incomes. Despite that, CEO pay stayed the same or even increased as 
shown in Table 1. As such, this could explain why the results are insignificant for return on 
assets. Irrespective of the level of profitability relative to competitors in the industry, CEO pay 
was mostly unaffected. 
The elasticity of total CEO compensation with respect to firm size is 0.39, slightly higher than 
the typical estimate of 0.35 documented in the review of Murphy (1999). This is driven mainly 
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by the large effect of size on equity compensation (elasticity of 0.499) and on non-equity 
compensation (elasticity of 0.320). 
The governance results indicate that CEOs who also chair the Board are compensated at a 
lower rate than CEOs who have to answer to an independent Chair. However, this aspect is 
insignificant or mildly significant for equity components of CEO pay. This result falls in line 
with the predictions and results from Hermalin (2005) who argued that CEOs are extracting 
higher compensation because of the high scrutiny they now face. Another way of phrasing the 
same phenomenon is to posit that some CEOs are tough negotiators and have extracted a higher 
pay for higher risks to their jobs. This would be akin to one of the predictions emanating from 
prospect theory, which suggests that firms with a small but above-average performance are 
willing to pay their CEOs a little more, but a lot less when performance is below average. Such 
firms would most likely have independent Directors. Independent compensation committees do 
not have that big of an effect in terms of CEO compensation. One would surmise that the more 
independent the audit and compensation committees, the less will be the level of CEO 
compensation However, this is not the case. This is perhaps because Boards are wary of 
compensation contracts and whether independent or not, compensation committees set 
compensation structures that closely follow the market trend. The governance attributes being 
largely insignificant open up a number of possible interpretations. First, it could be that the 
predictions of Hermalin (2005) apply to the US only and are not verified in the Canadian context 
given the sample of firms considered. Variations may be too small (relative to the US) in the 
S&P/TSX context, which is why there is almost no observed effect of governance on CEO pay. 
Second, if we reconcile the predictions by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hermalin (2005), 
where the former predicts that better governance is related to lower compensation and the latter 
predicts otherwise, it is possible that both are at play. In other words, for a subsample of firms, 
governance has a negative impact on CEO pay, whereas for another subsample, governance is 
positively related to CEO pay.  This would be an additional research question that can be 
explored in the future. For this paper, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
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Unionization is associated with higher CEO total compensation. This result was verified by 
multiple specification tests using different measures for size and profitability. In all cases, the 
trend is the same: unions are associated with firms that pay more in terms of non-equity 
components such as salary, and pension. For example, a one standard deviation increase in union 
density is associated with an 8.8% increase in total CEO pay without pension.10  The biggest 
driver of this is that unions seem to be related to firms that pay their CEOs higher in terms of 
non-equity compensation (salary+bonus+pension).  This result, while robust, must be interpreted 
in light of the period in which this study was conducted.  It is plausible that during the financial 
crisis, companies, regardless of unionization, may not have been able to pay options and 
restricted units as much as was initially anticipated. There was a fall (or statistical stagnation) in 
these payments in 2009 and 2010. Further highly-unionized companies are positively associated 
with high non-equity components of CEO pay, which usually remain fixed and represent a small 
fraction of total CEO pay. During the recession, these proportions became higher given that the 
equity components fell in value. This is further shown from the results in Table 4 where union 
density is positively related to salary and pension. A one standard deviation increase in union 
density is related to higher salaries and higher pensions by factors of 3.4% and 86% respectively. 
The relationship to pension allocations is economically very high. There may be a sorting of 
CEOs happening here or indeed a “ratchet” effect where lower-level employees receive higher 
wages and benefits (e.g. pensions) which drives up the value of salaries and pensions of the top 
management team. CEOs of heavily-unionized companies may also be more inclined towards 
secure and fixed sources of incomes.  Hypotheses 2a and 2c are, therefore, supported.11 
———————————— 
Insert TABLE 4 about here. 
———————————— 
Table 4 further indicates that unions are associated with firms that pay their CEOs high in 
terms of restricted stock units. Restricted stock, being stock that is transferable under certain 
                                                     
10 This is obtained by multiplying the appropriate coefficient with the average standard deviation of union density from 
Table 2. 
11 Comparisons of Random-Effects and pooled OLS results are available upon request. 
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conditions, are higher for heavily-unionized companies. More research is needed to consider 
what these conditions are and how they may be related to unions and to periods of distress. The 
estimate from the regression is very high and points to a one standard deviation increase in union 
density positively affecting restricted stock units by as much as 134%.  Hypothesis 2b is, 
therefore, not supported. 
One could go about comparing the characteristics of heavily-unionized companies with those 
that are less heavily unionized. If heavily unionized companies are less profitable, then this 
might be the reason behind the lower levels of CEO compensation in those companies. In other 
words, it is possible that the indirect effect of unions on CEO pay is still manifest. To address 
this and answer Hypothesis 3, I use an interaction between profitability and union density on top 
of the measures used thus far. Table 5 shows that the indirect channel is not validated. In other 
words, during times of financial distress, as posited by lower returns on assets, unions cannot put 
pressure and extract rent such that this would lower values of CEO pay. Instead, the results seem 
to suggest that union rigidities (such as high notice period, severance pay, and constraints on 
fluid employment) play no role in curbing CEO pay. CEO pay has not only withheld financial 
pressures (as shown by Bebchuk and Fried (2006)) but it has also withheld potential socio-
political pressures by unions.  A further observation from Table 5 is that profitability, as 
measured by returns on assets, has no impact on the relationship between unionization and total 
CEO pay.  Comparing the second column of results of Table 5 with the results from Table 3 
reveals (via a simple t-test) that the union influence on total CEO pay is statistically (and more-
or-less economically) the same whether or not return on assets is included in the estimations.   
———————————— 
Insert TABLE 5 about here. 
———————————— 
While this study started with the premise that unions can curb high levels of CEO pay, at least 
in times of financial distress, the results differ in that unions are associated with firms that pay 
high salaries and pensions to their CEOs. The influence of unions on bonus and option values is 
statistically zero.  These findings are in line with the findings from DiNardo (2000) and Singh 
(2002).  However, they contradict the findings from Gomez and Tzioumis (2006), even though 
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the latter also finds that CEO salary is (weakly) positively linked to union presence.  In general, 
there could be a couple of reasons as to why the main results of union influence on total CEO 
compensation differs between this paper and Gomez and Tzioumis (2006).  One could surmise 
that the measure for unionization used in the latter paper (dichotomous) is capturing too much 
noise, and was based in a time period where stock options were soaring.   
The results of this paper can be interpreted in several ways.  One interpretation in finding that 
unions are positively related to salaries, pensions and restricted stock units but insignificantly to 
bonuses and options is that CEOs of heavily-unionized firms may be automatically enrolled into 
pension schemes that unions value for their own members (and hence for all members of the 
company).  Similarly, the ratchet effect may be at play where higher wages at the bottom lead to 
higher salaries at the top.  Another possibility is that CEOs of heavily-unionized firms have 
different profiles to CEOs of lower-unionized firms.  More research is warranted on voluntary 
sorting of CEOs into companies.  It is plausible that older, more mature, experienced CEOs sort 
themselves into companies that are heavily unionized, while younger CEOs flock more towards 
lower-unionized firms.  Older CEOs may also be more risk-averse and may prefer higher fixed 
incomes and security.  They may not care too much about performance-related pay such as 
bonuses and equity compensation, and may in fact support rather than thwart unions.  These are 
plausible research questions that need further investigation.   Perhaps there is an equilibrium in 
the labor market of CEOs, where the sorting mechanism allocates CEOs to companies that most 
match their ambitions and levels of risk tolerance.         
This paper is not without limitations, however. One of the limitations is that the results are not 
generalizable to a “normal” period.  However, the argument of this paper is that this period by 
itself offers some interesting insights into patterns of CEO pay.  Prior research has found similar 
results between unionization and CEO pay, and this paper adds to these findings when 
circumstances are even more difficult.  What stems from this paper, amongst other things, is that 
CEOs of heavily-unionized companies have a different profile of pay, which relies more on fixed 
components rather than variable components.  This theoretical understanding, while not 
22 
 
sufficiently explored, had not been empirically tested up to this point in a multi-industry setting 
where union density rather than union presence is the measure for employee voice.    
A further limitation is that this study does not relate a causal model of CEO compensation. 
Unlike Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) who use a difference-in-difference approach to 
capture the effect of regulatory changes on CEO compensation, this paper’s findings are merely 
correlational in nature. Also, a more complex index of union strength should include, amongst 
other things, variables such as level of bargaining unit, and international or non-international 
nature of union. Union density is one of the best proxies but more is perhaps needed to support 
the theoretical hypotheses that unions can curb CEO pay. 
Further, the explanatory power of the various models and dependent variables vary quite a bit. 
This suggests a number of potential issues. First, some of the models may be misspecified 
whereby important controls and variables are not considered. This is, however, highly unlikely 
given that previous studies such as Bebchuk and Fried (2006); Core et al. (2008) use similar 
variables. Nonetheless, more research is required to look into what determines the levels of 
salary, bonus, pension and equity compensation. Omitted variables may include the quality of the 
labor-management relationship, the corporate culture, and the CEO affiliations. Second, it is also 
possible that variations in the dependent variables (especially the equity components) are too 
small which is why these models are performing poorly. The financial crisis may have reduced 
variability in such data which reduces the explanatory power of the empirical models being 
considered. 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to look into the relationship between governance, unionization and the 
various components of CEO compensation in Canada. Controlling for size, performance, 
industry and firm random effects, this paper finds that CEO compensation is only midly 
influenced by governance mechanisms. Higher CEO compensation is associated with stronger 
governance reflecting the hypothesis that CEOs tend to be compensated for the extra scrutiny 
that they now have to face. 
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This paper has also looked at the influence of unions on the various components of CEO pay. 
In a recessionary period, higher union density is associated with higher CEO total compensation.  
At the same time, the results do not suggest that heavily unionized firms are less profitable than 
their competitors and that unions are rent-seeking at the expense of the firm.  
This research suggests that the ill of income inequality may not be that easy to circumvent. 
Unions may need to play a different role, or be properly empowered to seek rents that will curb 
CEO pay and drive more “fairness” and equality in pay distribution. More research is needed to 
understand how and why unions can affect CEO compensation either directly or indirectly. 
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TABLE 1: Summary statistics for components of CEO Compensation 
 Means 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Salary 
          
799,471.80  
          
839,586.20  
          
928,094.40  
          
860,397.00  
          
860,770.20  
                     (350,778.50)  (439,857.30)  (609,651.80)  (455,445.70)  (480,285.70)  
Bonus                
      
1,191,980.30  
          
965,903.70  
      
1,123,478.50  
      
1,195,324.70  
      
1,119,020.30  
                     (1,699,442.70)  (1,075,869.60)  (1,736,854.10)  (1,059,782.70)  (1,408,251.50)  
Pension              
          
346,936.60  
          
406,081.80  
          
264,172.30  
          
310,212.10  
          
329,182.00  
                     (810,261.30)  (870,054.10)  (603,122.70)  (910,356.10)  (807,005.30)  
Options              
      
2,055,978.10  
      
1,596,135.10  
      
1,590,562.90  
      
1,680,172.30  
      
1,712,021.50  
                     (2,927,686.80)  (1,949,011.40)  (2,318,599.90)  (2,195,283.70)  (2,337,807.50)  
Restricted Stock Units 
      
1,111,731.40  
      
1,175,176.30  
      
1,225,201.10  
      
1,248,041.90  
      
1,196,354.80  
                     (1,755,281.00)  (3,194,801.90)  (2,257,482.50)  (1,514,423.30)  (2,260,975.80)  
Long-term Incentive Plans 
            
38,317.00  
            
16,909.60  
               
9,092.40  
               
5,516.20  
            
15,930.50  
                     (221,645.30)  (150,476.90)  (94,490.50)  (42,716.10)  (135,754.60)  
Total Compensation w/out Pension 
      
5,364,601.10  
      
5,023,510.70  
      
5,144,323.80  
      
5,151,394.10  
      
5,161,214.10  
                     (4,718,669.50)  (5,240,743.60)  (4,793,214.20)  (3,345,104.50)  (4,519,579.30)  
Total Compensation w/ Pension 
      
5,711,537.70  
      
5,429,592.50  
      
5,408,496.10  
      
5,461,606.20  
      
5,490,396.00  
                     (5,020,473.50)  (5,468,734.60)  (5,050,489.90)  (3,623,210.20)  (4,778,138.30)  
Observations 100 104 109 117 430 
Mean coefficients; standard deviations in parentheses    
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TABLE 2: Summary statistics for Corporate Financials and Union Density 
 
Means  
2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Total Assets (in $ billions) 38.907 43.574 42.099 43.534 42.091  
(102.574) (119.305) (111.789) (119.794) (113.402) 
      
Sales (in $ billions) 7.656 8.132 7.257 7.146 7.534 
 (9.618) (10.652) (9.503) (9.513) (9.797) 
      
Market Cap (in $ billions) 11.388 10.972 9.348 9.820 10.346 
 (15.203) (15.655) (13.052) (13.746) (14.384) 
      
Return on Assets (%) 7.006 4.790 2.889 5.567 5.024 
 (6.777) (8.218) (9.769) (6.205) (7.983) 
      
Return on Equity (%) 14.400 9.598 7.191 10.500 10.340 
 (18.160) (17.100) (16.100) (11.980) (16.060) 
      
Union Density        0.0922 0.138 0.159 0.166 0.141 
                     (0.195) (0.242) (0.252) (0.258) (0.240) 
Observations 100 104 109 117 430 
Mean coefficients; standard deviations in parentheses     
30 
 
TABLE 3: Random effects models with separate Dependent Variables: Total Compensation, Equity, and Non-Equity Components 
 Total Compensation 
Without Pension 
Total Compensation  
With Pension 
Equity  
Compensation 
Non-Equity 
Compensation 
Return on Assets – Industry Average ROA 0.142 0.229 -6.447* 1.102 
 (0.393) (0.394) (2.809) (0.523) 
     
Market Capitalization 0.385*** 0.388*** 0.499 0.320*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0384) (0.263) (0.0345) 
     
No CEO-Chair Split - - - - 
CEO-Chair Split/Chair is Related 0.496 0.542 5.717* 0.148 
 (0.349) (0.350) (2.404) (0.296) 
     
CEO-Chair Split/Lead Director Appointed 0.352 0.371 3.170 0.150 
 (0.360) (0.363) (2.401) (0.316) 
     
CEO-Chair Split and fully independent 0.598 0.617 5.216* 0.210 
 (0.357) (0.359) (2.399) (0.302) 
     
Full Audit Committee Independence -0.132 -0.131 -0.161 -0.136 
 (0.0865) (0.0863) (0.550) (0.0878) 
     
Full Compensation Committee Independence -0.0693 -0.0525 0.362 0.0204 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.884) (0.0899) 
     
Union Density 0.366* 0.373* 0.370 0.360* 
 (0.148) (0.146) (1.407) (0.160) 
     
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 11.92*** 11.89*** 4.740 12.80*** 
 (0.511) (0.512) (3.188) (0.454) 
Observations 430 430 430 430 
R2 overall 0.514 0.523 0.158 0.503 
Robust random-effects standard errors in parentheses     
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001     
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TABLE 4: Random effects models with separate Dependent Variables: Salary, Bonus, Pension, Options, and RSUs 
 Salary Bonus Pension Options Restricted Stock Units 
Return on Assets – Industry Average ROA -0.0658 6.804* 6.532 -8.328** -2.519 
 (0.148) (3.453) (5.729) (3.021) (2.895) 
      
Market Capitalization 0.203*** 0.785*** 0.697 0.676 1.051* 
 (0.0186) (0.226) (0.367) (0.362) (0.430) 
      
No CEO-Chair Split - - - - - 
CEO-Chair Split/Chair is Related -0.0296 3.702 2.701 3.663 4.343 
 (0.116) (1.917) (1.869) (2.171) (2.249) 
      
CEO-Chair Split/Lead Director Appointed 0.0494 1.764 2.283 1.559 3.230 
 (0.102) (1.940) (1.736) (1.793) (2.061) 
      
CEO-Chair Split and fully independent 0.0907 2.000 2.026 4.239* 4.460* 
 (0.100) (1.861) (1.769) (1.863) (2.104) 
      
Full Audit Committee Independence -0.0842 0.963 0.691 -1.217 0.873 
 (0.0528) (0.697) (0.887) (0.770) (0.579) 
      
Full Compensation Committee Independence -0.0802 0.00169 0.659 -0.541 1.536 
 (0.127) (0.880) (0.948) (0.982) (0.891) 
      
Union Density 0.140* -0.731 3.571* -0.581 5.582** 
 (0.0561) (1.227) (1.511) (1.863) (1.776) 
      
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 12.25*** 4.858 -1.651 5.014 -7.707 
 (0.225) (2.692) (3.867) (3.323) (4.454) 
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 
R2 overall 0.567 0.121 0.215 0.173 0.152 
Robust random-effects standard errors in parentheses      
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001      
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TABLE 5: Random effects models showing the indirect channel though which union 
density affects different components of CEO pay 
Explanatory Variables → Benchmarked ROA Union Density Benchmarked ROA 
 w/out Union density w/out ROA x Union Density 
Effects on: 
Total compensation w/out Pension 0.104 0.364∗ −1.441 
 (0.393) (0.148) (1.419) 
Total compensation with Pension 0.192 0.369∗ −1.434 
 (0.393) (0.146) (1.422) 
Equity components −6.503∗ 0.521 −6.224 
 (2.807) (1.357) (17.129) 
Non-Equity components 0.980 0.336∗ −0.912 
 (0.517) (0.154) (2.611) 
Salary −0.0768 0.142∗ −0.530 
 (0.147) (0.0558) (0.668) 
Bonus 6.927∗ −0.0933 −3.391 
 (3.470) (1.258) (12.386) 
Pension 6.254 3.476∗ 29.318 
 (5.701) (1.517) (18.098) 
Options −8.271∗∗ −0.438 −7.018 
 (2.996) (1.823) (19.246) 
  Restricted Stock Units 2.983 
(2.926) 
5.664** 
(1.771) 
-8.516 
(13.400) 
Observations 430 430 430 
The estimates above are calculated after considering all other firm and industry controls, as shown in previous 
tables. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
